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IT’S IN THE BAG: 
VOLUNTARINESS, SCOPE, AND THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT 
CONSENT 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK  
United States v. Harris1 
(decided July 27, 2011) 
I. THE MATTER OF UNITED STATES V. HARRIS 
The defendant in this matter made a motion to suppress evi-
dence that was seized during a search conducted by the Agency of 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (the “ATF”) on December 22, 
2010.2  Defendant‟s motion to suppress was based upon the conten-
tion that the search violated his Fourth Amendment protection against 
illegal search and seizure.3  The hearing for defendant‟s motion was 
scheduled and heard by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of 
New York on May 17, 2011.4  The court, upon its review of relevant 
case law and statutory interpretations, ruled that the defendant was 
not subjected to an illegal search and subsequent seizure, and, there-
fore, defendant‟s motion to suppress was denied.5 
 
1 No. 11 Cr. 92(RPP), 2011 WL 3273241 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011). 
2 Id. at *1. 
3 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
4 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *1 (stating that the “hearing was commenced on May 17, 
2011 . . . continued on June 3, 2011,” and was decided on July 27, 2011). 
5 Id. at *15. 
1
Fier: It’s In the Bag
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
688 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
 
The defendant, Kyle Harris, was the subject of an investiga-
tion being conducted by the ATF in connection with possession of 
drugs and firearms.6  On December 22, 2010, Agent McCormick and 
the ATF conducted “[an] arrest of the [d]efendant [at premises lo-
cated] at 16 Holly Street in New Bedford, Massachusetts.”7  During a 
sweep of the apartment, the officers located three to four persons in 
the apartment, including the defendant and one Tarean Joseph, who 
would later be used as a witness in the suppression hearing.8  Agent 
McCormick questioned the defendant in the apartment and informed 
him that he was being arrested by federal agents pursuant to his in-
volvement in a “Hobbs Act” robbery.9  During the questioning of the 
defendant, Agent McCormick asked “which room is yours,” at which 
point the defendant “motioned with his head over his shoulder [to] 
the room behind him.”10  The defendant was then asked whether there 
were guns or drugs present in the room, to which he said no.11  The 
agent asked if he could enter the room, to which the defendant re-
sponded with something to the effect of “[s]ure.”12 
While the exact response given by the defendant is questiona-
ble, Agent McCormick noted at the suppression hearing that the de-
fendant‟s answer was “definitely affirmative that [the agent] could 
search his room.”13  Agent McCormick did not remove defendant‟s 
 
6 Id. at *1. 
7 Id. 
8 Id.  Agent McCormick noted that the defendant was sitting on “a couch in the middle of 
the living room,” Mr. Joseph was “in a chair on the right of the room,” and a third person 
was “sitting in the back of the room on another chair.  Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *2. 
9 Id. at *2-3; 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006).  The Hobbs Act states, in pertinent part: 
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or 
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or 
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens phys-
ical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or pur-
pose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
Id. 
10 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *2. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citing Davis v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946) (stating that one exception to the necessity for a 
search warrant is the voluntary consent of the accused to the search)). 
13 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *2 (stating that the defendant‟s response was “clear[ ],” 
made in the presence of other officers, and was not made while any of the agents‟ guns were 
drawn). 
2
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handcuffs to have him sign a written consent to the search, due to the 
nature of crime he was accused of committing.14  Agent Michael 
Zeppieri, the supervising agent of the task force assigned to the inves-
tigation, affirmed that the defendant gave his verbal consent to have 
the room searched shortly after being read his Miranda rights.15  At 
the suppression hearing, Mr. Joseph, the individual who answered the 
door when the police arrived, stated that the officers “never showed 
[the warrant] to them,” and that he “never heard any officer ask [the 
defendant] for consent to search his room.”16  Agent McCormick re-
futed this, contending that Mr. Joseph was being questioned by a po-
lice detective, and would not have heard such a brief exchange be-
tween the defendant and the questioning agents.17 
In the search of the defendant‟s bedroom that followed, a 
sealed backpack was uncovered by ATF agents, which was subse-
quently opened.18  The search of the backpack and room yielded “a 
digital scale, several cell phones, and a Police Athletic League Identi-
fication from the Bronx for [the defendant].”19  According to the 
agents, at no time did the defendant or Mr. Joseph object to the 
search of the room.20 
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found 
during the search of his bedroom.21  Defense counsel argued that no 
constitutionally valid consent was given to the officers to search.22  In 
the event that consent could have been determined by the court to be 
given to the agents, the defendant contended that the consent was not 
voluntary, and, furthermore, that the search of the closed backpack 
was not within the general scope of consent to search a room.23 
The court acknowledged that “[w]arrantless searches „are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment−subject to only a few 
 
14 Id. at *3 (stating that the arrest warrant for the defendant was issued in connection with 
a “robbery [in which] the victim was very brutally stabbed”). 
15 Id. at *8. 
16 Id. at *7. 
17 Id. at *12. 
18 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *13. 
19 Id. at *3. 
20 Id. at *3-4. 
21 Id at *1. 
22 Id. at *10. 
23 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *10. 
3
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specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.‟ ”24  Among 
these limited exceptions is consent given by the individual being 
searched or someone with the authority over the area being 
searched.25  In order for such consent to be constitutionally valid, the 
court looked to well-established federal case law on consent, which 
point to the necessity of the consent to be “freely and voluntarily giv-
en.”26  Further, the prosecution bears “the burden of proving that the 
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”27 
The court in Harris agreed with the prosecution that the de-
fendant consented to the search of his bedroom by the arresting offic-
ers.28  While the testimony of the two officers differed slightly, the 
“pivotal fact [that the defendant] . . . consented to the search” of his 
room remained consistent between the two.29  The defendant‟s ac-
knowledgment of his room, the subsequent nod towards the room, 
and the affirmative response given to the agent‟s request to enter and 
search all comprised consent. 
The existence of consent did not completely defeat the defen-
dant‟s motion to suppress.  The prosecution still bore the burden to 
show that the consent was “voluntarily given,” otherwise it would be 
invalid under the Fourth Amendment.30  At the time the defendant 
gave his consent to the search, he remained handcuffed on the sofa 
and did not exhibit any aggressive or fearful behaviors.31  The court 
 
24 Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (internal citations omit-
ted)). 
25 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 (stating that consent to a search is a “specifically es-
tablished exception” to the necessity of a search warrant); United States v. Buettner-Janusch, 
646 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]he Government may scrutinize even the most private 
enclosure if the third party has the authority to permit the intrusion.”). 
26 See United States v. Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that volun-
tary consent is “essentially free and unconstrained [by] . . . all of the surrounding circums-
tances”). 
27 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *10 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Porras-
Quintero, No. 07 CR 228(RPP), 2007 WL 4531552, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007)). 
28 Id. at *11. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. (quoting Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d at 57 (“The test of voluntariness is whether the 
consent was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, and is 
a question of fact to be determined from all of the surrounding circumstances.”)); see also 
United States v. Kon Yu-Leung, 910 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that consent may be 
invalidated if it was given under “duress or coercion”). 
31 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *13 (“Mr. Harris was calm during the encounter, and the 
4
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found that at no point during the time where consent was requested 
did the officers draw their weapons or make any actions to intimidate 
or force the defendant to agree to a search.32  In an examination of the 
“totality of the surrounding circumstances,” the court held that the 
defendant was not coerced or intimidated into granting consent, but 
rather that it was given freely and volitionally.33  Because the consent 
was voluntary, it was constitutionally valid under the Fourth 
Amendment.34 
The last argument that the court considered in the defendant‟s 
motion to suppress was the defendant‟s contention that the search of 
the backpack in the bedroom was outside the scope of the consent 
given.35  The Supreme Court established the standard of “ „objective‟ 
reasonableness” in order to determine whether the search conducted 
was within the scope of consent given.36  The scope of consent is as-
certainable by determining what would be “objectively reasonable for 
the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect‟s consent permitted 
him to [search].”37  Consent to a search can either be given to police 
officers open-endedly, or limited to a specified area.38 
In answering the agent‟s request to “take a look around,” the 
defendant simply responded with a “yes,” “sure,” or some other short 
affirmative.39  This request, as asked by the officers after the defen-
dant indicated his room, provided notice to the defendant that they in-
tended to search the area to which the defendant signaled.40  Given 
his short affirmative response, an objectively reasonable individual 
would have believed that the entire room and its contents were within 
the scope of the consent granted by the defendant.41  By giving a ge-
 
defense witness Mr. Joseph testified that [the defendant] joked with the officers.”). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See Kon Yu-Leung, 910 F.2d at 41 (“Consent to search should be deemed valid if . . . 
[it] was voluntarily given . . . .”). 
35 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *13. 
36 Id. at *14 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (stating that an “objec-
tive reasonableness” standard should be applied in determining the scope of consent given)). 
37 Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 56 F.3d 418, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
38 See United States v. Snow, 44 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that open ended 
consent could be reasonably construed to lack any form of limitation). 
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neralized or open-ended consent, the agents were entitled to look an-
ywhere within the room for evidence of illegal activities, even inside 
of sealed containers.42  In the event the defendant wished to limit the 
search to specific areas within his room, he needed only to voice his 
objection and limitation.43 Therefore, the search of the closed back-
pack located within the defendant‟s bedroom was within the scope of 
consent given to the agents.44 
Because the defendant was found to have voluntarily granted 
consent to a search of his bedroom by the arresting ATF agents, and 
the objects searched and subsequently seized from the room were 
within the scope of consent given, the evidence at issue was deemed 
admissible.45  The defendant did not indicate that he wished to limit 
the scope of the consent he granted, nor was he coerced or strong-
armed into granting said consent.46  The court determined that the de-
fendant‟s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures was not violated and, therefore, denied the de-
fendant‟s motion to suppress the aforementioned evidence.47 
II. FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT TO A 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects 
people from unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement 
and government agencies.48  The Constitution has only one exception 
directly built into the verbiage of the construction of the Amendment, 
that such a search may be conducted with probable cause. 
In the seminal case, Mapp v. Ohio,49 lewd and lascivious con-
 
42 Id. (quoting Snow, 44 F.3d at 135 (“[I]t is self-evident that a police officer seeking gen-
eral permission to search a [room] is looking for evidence of illegal activity.  It is just as ob-
vious that such evidence might be hidden in closed containers.”)). 
43 Id. (stating that “[t]he agents‟ interpretation of his consent as including the right to 
search containers, such as backpacks, found in the bedroom was objectively reasonable,” and 
valid within the confines of the Fourth Amendment). 
44 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *14. 
45 Id. at *15. 
46 Id.; cf. Garcia, 56 F.3d at 422 (“So long as police do not coerce consent, a search con-
ducted on the basis of consent is not an unreasonable search.”). 
47 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *15. 
48 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
49 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
6
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traband was seized from the defendant‟s home during a warrantless 
search that was used to arrest her for a crime separate and apart from 
the purpose of the search.50  While following up on information the 
police had received that the defendant was hiding the perpetrator of a 
bombing, officers arrived at the house, demanded entrance, and sub-
sequently forced their way into the property.51  The officers did not 
discover the individual they were searching for, but rather, found 
sexual and pornographic materials that were illegal under state law.52  
At trial, the court found that the police officers acted legally within 
the confines of probable cause in their search and seizure of the mate-
rials at issue.53 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case as a re-
sult of its determination that such a search violates the Fourth 
Amendment.54  In reaffirming its holding in Weeks v. United States,55 
the Court reiterated its interpretation of the effect of the language of 
the Fourth Amendment: 
[T]he 4th Amendment put the courts of the United 
States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their 
power and authority, under limitations and restraints 
(and) forever secure(d) the people, their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the guise of law and the 
duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon 
all entrusted under our Federal system with the en-
forcement of the laws.
56
 
In Mapp, the Supreme Court showed its proclivity towards a 
strict interpretation of the language of the Constitution in regards to 
 
50 Id. at 643 (“[T]he Supreme Court of Ohio found that her conviction was valid though 
„based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of lewd and lascivious books and pictures 
unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of defendant‟s home.‟ ”). 
51 Id. at 644 (“Upon their arrival at that house, the officers knocked on the door and de-
manded entrance but appellant . . . refused to admit them without a search warrant . . . 
[which led to] at least one of the several doors to the house [being] forcibly opened . . . 
[through which] the policemen gained admittance.”). 
52 Id. at 645. 
53 Id. 
54 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. 
55 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
56 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 647 (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391-92). 
7
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the ability of law enforcement and the courts to search a person or 
property without a warrant.57  Absent a substantial reason justifying 
probable cause, the Court here established its view on cases involving 
otherwise unreasonable search and seizure.58 
a. Federal Interpretation of Voluntariness of Consent 
In certain situations, the United States Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged the existence of exceptions to the necessity of a search 
warrant in the pursuit of justice.59  One of these exceptions is the vo-
luntary consent to a warrantless search by the individual being 
searched, or by a person with the authority to consent to a search over 
a certain area.60  So long as the consent given to a search is voluntary, 
the subsequent search does not violate the Fourth Amendment.61 
The Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte62 sought to provide 
guidance as to what constitutes “voluntariness” for the purposes of 
valid consent.63  The defendant in this matter was subjected to a 
search of his vehicle by a police officer following a routine traffic 
stop, which led to his arrest for possession of a check with the intent 
to defraud.64  The Court granted certiorari for the purposes of deter-
mining whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that 
consent must be uncoerced and made with the knowledge that such 
consent “could be freely and effectively withh[e]ld.”65 
In referring to earlier case law on the issue, the Court noted 
that no previous cases involving unreasonable search and seizure 
provided a clear and “talismanic definition of „voluntariness‟ me-
chanically applicable to the host of situations where the question has 
 
57 Id. at 659 (“If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it in-
vites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”). 
58 Id. at 660. 
59 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970)). 
60 Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946)). 
61 See id. 
62 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
63 Id. at 223-24. 
64 Id. at 219-20. 
65 Id. at 221-22 (stating that the district court denied the defendant‟s writ of habeas corpus 
and defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which subsequently “vacated 
the order denying the writ and remanded the case”). 
8
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arisen.”66  Given the broad scope of scenarios where voluntariness is 
at issue, the Supreme Court reflected upon the “test of voluntariness” 
as established by English and American courts over the prior two 
hundred years, which was to be applied in the questioning of sus-
pects.67  As the Court explained, this test consists of the following 
question: 
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker?  If it is, if he has 
willed to confess, it may be used against him.  If it is 
not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for 
self-determination critically impaired, the use of his 
confession offends due process.
68
 
The Court in Schneckloth qualified this test by including a require-
ment for the assessment of “the totality of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances” in order to determine the will of the defendant.69  This 
standard, as the Court stated, is to be utilized to determine the volun-
tariness of consent to a search.70  The Court, in applying its test, held 
that the state bears only the burden of showing that the search was 
made with consent, and that the consent was not the product of “du-
ress or coercion, express or implied.”71  The determination of volun-
tariness is fact-specific and is “to be determined from all the circums-
tances . . . of which the [defendant‟s] knowledge of a right to refuse 
is a factor.”72 
In a pair of cases occurring approximately a decade apart, the 
Court examined whether the boarding of buses by police officers and 
their subsequent request to search passengers and luggage coerced 
passengers to consent.73  In both of these cases, the Court focused on 
the circumstances surrounding the searches, and whether a reasonable 
person in the place of the defendants would have understood that they 
 
66 Id. at 224. 
67 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225. 
68 Id. at 225-26 (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). 
69 Id. at 226. 
70 Id. at 227. 
71 Id. at 248-49.  The case was reversed on the basis that the Ninth Circuit applied an in-
appropriate standard in determining the voluntariness of consent.   
72 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49. 
73 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
9
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could refuse to consent to a search.74  In Florida v. Bostick,75 police 
officers boarded a bus and requested to see passengers‟ identification, 
tickets and inspect their luggage for narcotics.76  By positioning 
themselves in the aisle, the officers essentially blocked off the pas-
sengers means of egress from the bus.77  The defendant, a passenger 
on the bus, was subsequently questioned by officers and informed of 
his right to refuse, but he granted consent to the officers, who subse-
quently found cocaine in his luggage and arrested him.78  The Court 
granted certiorari in order to determine whether the officers‟ boarding 
of the bus “constitute[d] a „seizure,‟ ” and whether an individual on 
the bus would have been coerced into granting consent to a search 
thereafter.79 
The scenario in United States v. Drayton80 was very similar to 
the facts of Bostick.  In Drayton, officers boarded a stopped bus at a 
rest stop and asked passengers for permission to search for illegal 
drugs or firearms.81  In a situation similar to that of Bostick, the offic-
ers positioned themselves at the front and rear of the bus, trapping the 
passengers between them.82  A search of the defendants uncovered 
two bundles containing over half a kilogram of cocaine in total.83  
Here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the defen-
dants were “seized” by not being informed of their right to refuse a 
search, and whether their ensuing consent to the search was volunta-
ry.84 
In both cases, the Supreme Court held in favor of the state.85  
 
74 See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207-08; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40. 
75 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
76 Id. at 431-32. 
77 Id. at 435. 
78 Id. at 432 (“[P]olice specifically advised [defendant] that he had a right to refuse con-
sent . . . [and] at no time did the officers threaten [the defendant] . . . .”). 
79 Id. at 433-34. 
80 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
81 Id. at 197-99. 
82 Id. at 197-98. 
83 Id. at 199. 
84 Id. at 197 (stating that the Court was required to consider whether passengers must be 
advised by officers of “their right not to cooperate” or consent to a search). 
85 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207-08 (holding that officers do not need to inform persons of 
their right to refuse a search, so long as a reasonable individual would have construed that 
they have such a right); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40 (holding that consent to a search is vo-
luntary if a reasonable person would understand that consent to said search may be lawfully 
10
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The Court in Bostick applied the similar voluntariness standard as ap-
plied in Schneckloth, and held that, upon a review of the totality of 
the “circumstances surrounding the encounter,” consent to a search is 
voluntary when a reasonable person would understand that he or she 
has the right to refuse to give such consent.86  The Court in Drayton 
came to a similar conclusion.  Because the defendants were not con-
fronted or threatened in any manner and “a reasonable person [would 
have known] that he or she was free to refuse [giving consent],” the 
consent given was voluntary and valid.87 
The Second Circuit has also qualified what it considers valid 
voluntary consent.  In United States v. Garcia,88 the court considered 
whether consent to a search, apart from being voluntary, needs also to 
be “knowing” consent.89  The defendant in this case was subjected to 
a search by police officers who suspected him of having purchased a 
firearm.90  The defendant‟s wife granted the police access to the 
home, and, after a discussion with the officers, the defendant re-
trieved and presented the firearm in question to the officers.91  The 
defendant, although not arrested at the time, was later arrested and 
indicted following an act of vandalism on the car of the person who 
informed the officers about the firearm.92 
Following a suppression hearing in which evidence was sup-
pressed pursuant to the district court‟s finding that “consent was [not] 
given knowingly and voluntarily,” the Court of Appeals heard the 
state‟s appeal.93  While the court acknowledged that a waiver of one‟s 
rights is inherent in the process of a fair criminal trial, it explained 
that Fourth Amendment cases are held to different standards, as set 
forth in Schneckloth and its progeny.94  Since knowledge is only a 
 
refused). 
86 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439. 
87 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206-07. 
88 56 F.3d 418 (2d Cir. 1995). 
89 Id. at 422, 424. 
90 Id. at 420 (stating that the defendant “had been [previously] convicted of a felony,” 
more specifically, assault, and was “in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)”). 
91 Id. at 420-21. 
92 Id. at 421. 
93 Garcia, 56 F.3d at 421-22. 
94 Id. at 422 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241 (explaining the “vast difference be-
tween” rights protected in a criminal trial versus those protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment)). 
11
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factor to be considered by a court analyzing the “totality of all the 
circumstances” involved in consent given to a search, there is no suf-
ficient legal basis for the trial court‟s requiring that the defendant‟s 
consent was “knowing,” in addition to being voluntary.95 
b. Federal Interpretation of the Scope of Consent 
The federal judiciary has also addressed the limitation upon 
what is included within the scope of consent given by an individual to 
law enforcement.  In its general analyses of consent, the Supreme 
Court has always defaulted to the reasonableness of a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.96  The same concept of “reasonableness” has 
been recognized as the limiting factor in the scope of consent given, 
as outlined in Florida v. Jimeno.97 
In Jimeno, the defendant was pulled over by an officer in a 
routine traffic stop.98  Believing the defendant to be in the possession 
of narcotics, the officer “asked permission to search the car,” in-
formed the defendant of his right to refuse, and was subsequently 
granted consent by the defendant.99  The search uncovered a “brown 
paper bag, [which was located] on the floorboard,” and was found to 
contain a “kilogram of cocaine.”100  The defendant was arrested and, 
prior to trial, “moved to suppress the cocaine” because he did not be-
lieve that the search he allegedly consented to included the opening 
of bags and containers in his car, namely the one containing the co-
caine.101 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
closed containers, which “might reasonably hold the object of the 
search,” are excluded from general consent to a search.102  In its ex-
 
95 Id. at 424 (stating that a defendant‟s “lack of awareness” only matters if consent was 
given under duress or was coerced). 
96 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
97 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)). 
98 Id. at 249 (stating that the officer that was pursuing the defendant had overheard a 
phone conversation between someone and the defendant allegedly arranging a drug transac-
tion, which gave way to the pursuit). 
99 Id. at 249-50. 
100 Id. at 250. 
101 Id. (emphasis added) (“[Defendant‟s] mere consent to search the car did not carry with 
it specific consent to open the bag and examine its contents.”). 
102 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249. 
12
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amination of the case, the Court applied an “ „objective‟ reasonable-
ness” standard: “[w]hat would the typical reasonable person have un-
derstood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect” to 
have been included within the scope of the search.103  The Court con-
cluded that an objective individual in the place of the defendant 
would have reasonably foreseen that consent to a search for drugs 
within an area—in this case, a car—would include containers that 
might contain drugs.104 
The Second Circuit maintained the same view as the Supreme 
Court‟s holding in Jimeno.  In United States v. Snow,105 the defendant 
was stopped for a traffic violation when a police officer noticed a 
shotgun in the back seat of his vehicle.106  The defendant gave the of-
ficer consent to a search of the vehicle, which resulted in the discov-
ery of a duffel bag containing pistol parts and a small bag containing 
marijuana.107  Mirroring the situation in Jimeno, a suppression hear-
ing was held to determine whether evidence found in closed contain-
ers should be considered inadmissible as outside the scope of the 
search‟s consent.108 
In its application of the Supreme Court‟s holding in Jimeno, 
the court expounded upon what the officer intended by the word 
“search.”109  The court held that, by any definition of the word 
“search,” a reasonable individual would imply that a consented-to 
search would include any “readily-opened, closed containers discov-
ered inside the car.”110  In its explanation, the court recognized that an 
individual has the “right to limit the scope of his consent.”111 
A more recent case in the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Lu-
cas,112 addressed the scope of a search within a private residence.113  
 
103 Id. at 251. 
104 Id. at 251-52 (delineating between a reasonable search within an unlocked container 
versus an unreasonable search of a locked container). 
105 44 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1995). 
106 Id. at 134. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. (stating that the district court suppressed the items that were found in the closed 
containers, but not the shotgun, which was considered as “in plain view” of the arresting of-
ficer). 
109 Id. at 135. 
110 Snow, 44 F.3d at 135. 
111 Id. (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252). 
112 640 F.3d 168 (6th Cir. 2011). 
13
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In Lucas, police responded to an informant‟s tip about the defen-
dant‟s purported marijuana-growing operation in his home.114  After 
speaking with the defendant, one of the detectives noticed marijuana 
paraphernalia and requested to search the house.115  The defendant 
granted consent to a limited search of his residence which was to in-
clude a search for “illegal controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, 
and „other material or records pertaining to narcotics.‟ ”116  During an 
inspection of a laptop that police expected to contain records related 
to the defendant‟s marijuana production, officers uncovered images 
of child pornography in an attached flash drive.117 
In its review of defendant‟s appeal from a suppression hear-
ing, the court considered whether a personal computer is within the 
scope of a search of a private residence.118  Because the defendant 
maintained written records of his marijuana-growing operations, the 
court recognized that the officer‟s expectation that more records were 
on the laptop was reasonable.119  Furthermore, the laptop was not se-
cured by a password, which the court maintained was the equivalent 
of an unlocked container in a vehicle.120  Lastly, the court held that 
the search of the attached flash drive was not unconstitutional, as 
upon his recognition of pornographic images of children, the detec-
tive ceased his search and awaited the issuance of a search warrant.121 
c. Federal Interpretation of Who May Grant Consent 
Apart from the issues of the voluntariness and scope of con-
 
113 Id. at 175, 177. 
114 Id. at 170. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 170-71 (stating that the defendant signed a form consenting to the search after 
being told that a search warrant would most likely be issued on the basis of “probable cause” 
should he not sign.). 
117 Lucas, 640 F.3d at 172, 179 (explaining that prior to continuing his search of the flash 
drive, the detective stopped “in anticipation of obtaining a search warrant,” and defendant 
was later indicted on charges for possession of both the marijuana as well as the child porno-
graphy). 
118 Id. at 177 (stating that the Sixth Circuit had “not previously issued a published opinion 
applying the analysis of . . . automobile search cases . . . [to] a consent search of a personal 
computer located inside a private residence”). 
119 Id. at 177-78. 
120 Id. at 178. 
121 Id. at 179-80. 
14
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sent granted by a person subject to a search, the federal courts have 
also explored the issue of who may grant valid consent to a search 
aside from the party in question.  In United States v. Matlock,122 the 
United States Supreme Court was faced with this very question.123  At 
issue in this case was whether the voluntary consent of one Ms. 
Graff, who granted police consent to search a bedroom she shared 
with the defendant, was valid under the Fourth Amendment.124 
Police arrested the defendant in Matlock outside of his home 
for the “robbery of a federally insured bank . . . [under] 18 U.S.C. [§] 
2113.”125  Subsequent to the arrest, the officers were admitted to the 
home by Ms. Graff and given access to search the bedroom she 
shared with the defendant for a weapon and stolen money, the latter 
of which was found inside a bag in the bedroom closet.126  Following 
the arrest, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
found in the bedroom, arguing that he did not consent to the search.127  
The district court, and, subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, both held in favor of the defendant, citing that Ms. 
Graff did not have the “actual authority to consent to the search” on 
behalf of the defendant.128 
In hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Se-
venth Circuit‟s decision.129  The Supreme Court held that for third 
party consent to a warrantless search to be valid, the grantor of the 
consent must “possess[ ] common authority over [the area to be 
searched] or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects 
sought to be inspected.”130  In this case, the prosecution showed that 
Ms. Graff had sufficient control and authority over the bedroom, and, 
in the absence of the defendant, could grant consent to a warrantless 
search of the room.131 
 
122 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
123 Id. at 166 (determining whether consent by a third party to search another‟s living 
quarters is valid to render evidence seized as admissible). 
124 Id. at 166-67. 
125 Id. at 166. 
126 Id. at 166-67. 
127 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166. 
128 Id. at 167-69. 
129 Id. at 169. 
130 Id. at 171 (stating that the prosecution must show that a sufficient relationship existed 
between the third party and the area of which the search is being consented to). 
131 Id. at 176-77. 
15
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The Supreme Court considered yet another issue in regards to 
third party consent in Illinois v. Rodriguez.132  In Rodriguez, police 
responded to a call made by a woman, Ms. Fischer, who claimed she 
was assaulted by the defendant.133  Ms. Fischer went with the police 
to the apartment where the defendant resided, which she referred to 
as “our” apartment, and granted the officers access to the apart-
ment.134  After seeing drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view, the 
officers proceeded to the bedroom where they discovered more drugs 
and the defendant, who was placed under arrest.135 
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that 
Ms. Fischer had previously “vacated the apartment” and therefore 
had no authority to give consent to a search.136  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine whether the officers reasonably be-
lieved Ms. Fischer had the authority to give consent to a search and 
conducted said search in reliance on that belief.137  The Court likened 
this situation to that of police officers entering premises without a 
warrant because they reasonably, yet incorrectly, “believe they are in 
pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape.”138  In such cases, 
there is no violation of the defendant‟s Fourth Amendment rights.139  
The Court reiterated, as established previously in Brinegar v. United 
States,140 that “[b]ecause many situations which confront officers in 
the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room 
must be allowed for some mistakes on their part.  But the mistakes 
must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability.”141  The Supreme Court ultimately 
 
132 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
133 Id. at 179. 
134 Id. at 179-80. 
135 Id. at 180 (stating that the defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled sub-
stance with intent to deliver). 
136 Id. (stating that the defendant‟s motion was granted by the county court and later af-
firmed by the appellate court). 
137 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179, 181 (stating that the Supreme Court is faced with an issue 
it “expressly reserved in Matlock,” whether third party consent to a warrantless search is va-
lid if the police reasonably believe the third party has the common authority to grant such 
consent, but, in fact, does not) (emphasis added). 
138 Id. at 186. 
139 Id. at 189. 
140 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
141 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176). 
16
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held that third party consent is valid, even if based upon erroneous 
authority, so long as the officers reasonably believed the party to 
have the actual authority to consent to such a search.142 
The Second Circuit has further explored the issue of who may 
grant valid consent under the Fourth Amendment.  In United States v. 
Buettner-Janusch,143 the court examined the question of whether 
another exception exists that gives a third party the right to consent to 
a search over an area of “common authority.”144  In this case, a search 
was conducted in the defendant‟s laboratory after defendant‟s col-
leagues contacted the authorities believing that the defendant was 
manufacturing illegal narcotics at his place of employment.145  The 
defendant‟s research assistant and a fellow professor gave consent to 
the officers to search the laboratory where they worked, and the 
search yielded evidence of precursor materials used for the manufac-
ture of LSD and other illegal drugs.146  The defendant was arrested 
and found guilty on a number of counts involving the manufacture, 
possession, and intent to sell illegal drugs.147 
The consent to the search at issue was given by the defen-
dant‟s colleagues and employer, and not by the defendant himself.148  
The Second Circuit acknowledged the existence of third-party con-
sent as an exception to the Fourth Amendment‟s limitation of 
searches.149  The Second Circuit had previously established a rule 
that: “[c]onsent to a search by one with access to the area searched, 
and either common authority over it, a substantial interest in it or 
permission to exercise that access, express or implied, alone validates 
 
142 Id. at 188-89. 
143 646 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-
2054). 
144 Id. at 761, 764. 
145 Id. at 761. 
146 Id. at 763. 
147 Id. at 763-64. 
148 Buettner-Janusch, 646 F.2d at 764 (“Throughout this litigation, the prosecution has 
maintained that the May 17 search was validated by the consent of Jolly and Richard Macris, 
[the defendant‟s colleagues, and such] . . . consent to search was freely and voluntarily giv-
en.”). 
149 Id. (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (explicating that third party consent to a search 
is valid “when a defendant can be said to have assumed the risk that someone having au-
thority over the area” may grant such consent to officers)). 
17
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the search.”150  In applying the aforementioned rule, the court here 
determined that both the research assistant and professor had access 
to and common authority over the laboratory in which they all 
worked, but by granting access to his colleagues, the defendant gave 
up any reasonable expectation of privacy that would have invalidated 
the search.151  Ultimately, the court held that a third party, such as a 
coworker, may grant consent to a search over an area of shared com-
mon authority, and affirmed the conviction of the defendant.152 
III. NEW YORK STATE’S INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT TO A 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution pro-
vides for the right of individuals to “be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . 
and [that] no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”153  This part of Sec-
tion 12 mirrors verbatim the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.  This is evidence of the desire of the framers of the state consti-
tution to maintain the same level of security of the fundamental 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure as those who 
drafted the federal Constitution.  For this reason, cases in the state 
courts involving searches are particularly scrutinized in order to de-
termine whether there truly was consent.  The decisions of the New 
York state courts have traditionally afforded greater protections to 
defendants in these seizure cases, making it more difficult for the 
prosecution to meet the standard to prove that consent was voluntari-
ly given and that the search conducted fell within the scope of con-
sent given.154 
 
150 Id. at 765 (quoting United States v. Gradowski, 502 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
151 Id. at 765-66. 
152 Id. at 765, 767. 
153 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
154 See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575 (N.Y. 1976). 
18
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a.  New York State’s Interpretation of Voluntariness 
of Consent 
The New York Court of Appeals has traditionally maintained 
a similar standpoint on voluntariness of consent as the federal judi-
ciary, that consent to search, so long as it is voluntarily given, is a 
waiver of Fourth Amendment protections.155  In People v. Kuhn,156 
the court reviewed a pair of cases in which the defendants alleged a 
violation of their constitutional protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure.157  In these cases, the defendants were both sub-
jected to searches in an airport to after giving verbal consent to offic-
ers.158  Both defendants were subsequently arrested for possession of 
illicit materials.159 
The court examined whether or not the defendants gave valid 
voluntary consent.160  In both cases, the court held that the state “sus-
tained its burden of establishing a voluntary consent,” as set forth by 
the standards in Schneckloth.161  The defendants both gave verbal af-
firmative consent, and the officers conducting the searches did not act 
in a manner that was coercive or intimidating to the defendants.162 
The Court of Appeals in People v. Gonzalez163 drastically 
modified the way New York courts approach the issue of voluntari-
ness of consent.164  In Gonzalez, the defendants were a husband and 
wife arrested for the possession of drugs after the husband was set-up 
in a drug transaction with federal agents of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration.165  After an initial altercation between the agents and 
the defendant-husband, the defendants were handcuffed and sepa-
 
155 See People v. Kuhn, 306 N.E.2d 777, 779 (N.Y. 1973) (referencing Davis, 328 U.S. 
582). 
156 306 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 1973). 
157 Id. at 778. 
158 Id. at 778-79. 
159 Id. (stating that defendant Boungermino was arrested for possession of marijuana, and 
defendant Kuhn was arrested for possession of a hypodermic needle and heroin). 
160 Id. at 779. 
161 Kuhn, 306 N.E.2d at 779 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221). 
162 Id. 
163 347 N.E.2d 575 (N.Y. 1976). 
164 Id. at 580-81. 
165 Id. at 577-78. 
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rated.166  The agents informed the defendants of their desire to search 
the home, and had both of them sign a written statement consenting 
to the search.167 
On the state‟s appeal from a suppression hearing, the court 
applied a four-prong analysis to determine whether a defendant has 
given valid voluntary consent under the state and federal constitu-
tions.168  The four factors the court took into consideration were: 
[W]hether the consenter is in custody or under arrest, 
and the circumstances surrounding the custody or ar-
rest[,] . . . the background of the consenter [or expe-
rience dealing with police officers,] . . . whether the 
consenter has been, previously to the giving of con-
sent, or for that matter even later, evasive or un-
cooperative with the law enforcement authorities[,] . . . 
[and] whether the defendant was advised of his right 
to refuse to consent.
169
 
In its analysis of the situation experienced by the defendants, the 
court determined that the defendants: were detained and intimidated 
by the presence of a large number of federal agents; had little expe-
rience in dealing with the police; responded to the agents in a defiant 
and resistive manner, and; while presented with a form advising them 
of their right to refuse consent, were in a coercive atmosphere that 
negated any exercise of their right to refuse.170  While the court noted 
that the last factor regarding knowledge of the right to refuse is not 
requisite, the sum of the circumstances surrounding the arrest resulted 
in a violation of the defendants‟ rights under both the federal and 
state constitutions.171 
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, has applied a 
slightly more stringent interpretation as to what qualifies as voluntary 
 
166 Id. at 578. 
167 Id. at 579 (explaining that the defendant-husband stated, at the time of his signing the 
consent form, that he did not know whether or not “his wife had disposed of the drugs” prior 
to letting the agents into the apartment). 
168 Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580-81. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 581-82. 
171 Id. at 582 (“The instant seizure would have hardly survived scrutiny if the matter had 
been prosecuted in the Federal courts as the agents at some point had intimated they would 
do.  It may not survive scrutiny in the State courts.”). 
20
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consent to a search.  In People v. Schwab,172 the court was faced with 
the issue of whether a search conducted by police officers of an 
apartment was a violation of the defendant‟s Fourth Amendment 
rights.173  The officers entered the building under what was claimed 
to be valid consent from the defendants, and “seized contraband 
items,” namely controlled substances.174 
On appeal from a hearing denying suppression of the evi-
dence seized, the Fourth Department sought to expand upon the defi-
nition of what constitutes voluntary consent to a search.175  In apply-
ing a statement made in United States v. Smith,176 the court held that, 
in order for consent to be voluntary, it must be “unequivocal, specific 
and intelligently given.”177  This standard enlarges the burden placed 
upon the state in showing that the consent given was, in fact, volunta-
ry.178 
b. New York State’s Interpretation of the Scope of 
Consent 
The Court of Appeals has also expanded upon the federal ju-
diciary‟s interpretation regarding the scope of a search conducted by 
officers subsequent to valid voluntary consent.  In People v. 
Adams,179 police officers were in pursuit of the defendant who threat-
ened to shoot his girlfriend by pointing a gun at her and subsequently 
opened fire on an officer.180  The defendant fled, and the officers 
were led by his girlfriend to the apartment where he was hiding.181  
 
172 382 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 1976). 
173 Id. at 158. 
174 Id. at 159 (stating that the officers‟ entry onto the premises was not conducted due to 
“exigent circumstances” and must thereby rely on valid voluntary consent). 
175 Id. (recognizing that consent to a search must be “freely and voluntarily given,” and 
that it is not voluntary “if it is the product of duress or coercion”). 
176 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962). 
177 Schwab, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (stating that the search of defendant‟s home failed to 
meet this requirement (quoting Smith, 308 F.2d at 663)). 
178 See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (“When a prosecutor seeks to 
rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the 
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”). 
179 422 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1981). 
180 Id. at 538. 
181 Id. (stating that the defendant‟s girlfriend had a key to the apartment and was able to 
give the police access to the apartment). 
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The girlfriend also told officers where the defendant stored weapons 
and ammo.182  The defendant was arrested five days later.183 
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
weapons, arguing that the scope of the consent given to the officers to 
conduct a warrantless search did not include the search of a closet.184  
On appeal from the denial of the defendant‟s motion, the Court of 
Appeals determined that the officers relied on the apparent authority 
of the girlfriend to consent to entry into the apartment and that any 
subsequent search would need to be objectively reasonable.185  The 
court held that “it was clearly reasonable [under the circumstances] 
for the officers . . . to rely on [the girlfriend‟s] apparent capability to 
consent to a search of the closet . . . .”186  While acting under the ex-
igent circumstances of the situation, the officers were still bound to 
the “objective reasonableness” standard outlined by the Supreme 
Court in Jimeno.187 
The Court of Appeals has also determined that the scope of 
consent in a search is limited to the general consent given, and that 
such consent does not include the material alteration of an area to 
find the suspected evidence.188  In People v. Gomez,189 a police offic-
er pulled a car over for a routine traffic stop and noticed, upon in-
spection, that the car possessed characteristics of vehicles that are of-
ten used in narcotics trafficking and transport.190  The officer 
requested consent to search, which was granted by the defendant.191  
 
182 Id. at 538-39 (“[Defendant‟s girlfriend] pointed out the closet in which she claimed 
defendant stored his weapons [and, inside,] the police found a .308 calibre rifle . . . [and] 
ammunition.”). 
183 Id. at 539. 
184 Adams, 422 N.E.2d at 539. 
185 Id. at 540-41 (“We emphasize that the police belief must be reasonable, based upon an 
objective view of the circumstances present and not upon the subjective good faith of the 
searching officers.”). 
186 Id. at 541. 
187 See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249 (holding that the scope of a search pursuant to valid con-
sent must be that which an objectively reasonable individual would believe to be included). 
188 See People v. Gomez, 838 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (N.Y. 2005) (stating that an officer may 
not jeopardize the “structural integrity” on the basis of general consent). 
189 838 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 2005). 
190 Id. at 1272 (“[U]pon [the officer‟s] inspection [of the car, he] not[ed] a fresh under-
coating around the gas tank . . . a tampered registration card . . . [and] darkly tinted windows 
. . . .”). 
191 Id. 
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Using a pocket knife and a crowbar, the officer pried up the floor-
board of the vehicle and opened part of the gas tank, revealing ap-
proximately one and a half pounds of cocaine.192 
In its review of the case, the Court of Appeals relied upon 
precedent set forth in Jimeno and the litany of cases that followed.193  
While the defendant was found to have granted general consent to the 
search by the arresting officer, that search was bound by the “objec-
tive reasonableness” standard.194  In an effort to establish a clearer 
standard for the scope of a search conducted with consent, the court 
established that “once a search exceeds the objectively reasonable 
scope of a voluntary consent, a more specific request or grant of per-
mission is needed, in the absence of probable cause, in order to justi-
fy damage to the searched area or item sufficient to require its re-
pair.”195  Because such a “damag[ing]” search was conducted of the 
defendant‟s vehicle and exceeded the scope of consent, the case was 
reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals.196 
c. New York State’s Interpretation of Who May 
Grant Consent 
The New York state judiciary has adopted and modified the 
approach taken by the federal courts in regards to who may grant va-
lid consent to a search.  The Court of Appeals has acknowledged that, 
in any area in which “two or more individuals share a common right 
of access to or control,” either one of the parties may grant consent to 
a warrantless search in the absence of the other.197  In addition to this 
well-settled issue, the New York courts have further encountered 
some unique situations in regards to third party consent to warrantless 
searches and when such consent is valid under the state and federal 
 
192 Id. at 1272-73 (stating that after his arrest and indictment, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress claiming that no voluntary consent was given and that if consent could be found, 
“the search exceeded the scope” of consent). 
193 Id. at 1273. 
194 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). 
195 Id. at 1274; id. (Read, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority seeks to establish a 
“bright-line rule[]” for determining the scope of consent, which is “eschewed” by the Su-
preme Court in regards to Fourth Amendment cases). 
196 Id. 
197 People v. Cosme, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1979) (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 
171; People v. Wood, 293 N.E.2d 559, 560 (N.Y. 1973)). 
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constitutions. 
In People v. Cosme,198 the Court of Appeals was faced with 
the question of whether a third party may grant consent to officers in 
the presence of the suspect party and contrary to the suspect‟s denial 
of such consent.199  In Cosme, the police were informed by the defen-
dant‟s fiancée that the defendant was “storing a gun and a large quan-
tity of cocaine in the apartment” shared by the two.200  When the of-
ficers arrived, the defendant‟s fiancée granted them access to search, 
which was refused shortly thereafter by the defendant, who was 
present in the home.201  Defendant was subsequently indicted for pos-
session of narcotics and a firearm.202 
Following a denial of his motion to suppress the evidence on 
the basis of a lack of his consent to the search, the defendant appealed 
to the Appellate Division, and ultimately the Court of Appeals.203  
The Court of Appeals held that because the defendant‟s fiancée had 
“an unrestricted right to share in the use” of and common authority 
over the bedroom, she was allowed to grant consent to the search, 
contrary to the later refusal by the defendant.204  Because his fiancée 
gave valid consent prior to his refusal, the court determined that the 
defendant‟s objection to the consent was “ineffective,” as it was un-
timely.205 
The Appellate Division, First Department, much like the 
Second Circuit in Buettner-Janusch, further qualified who may grant 
voluntary consent to a search in People v. Nalbandian.206  In Nalban-
dian, officers received a call to “interview a robbery complainant” at 
 
198 397 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1979). 
199 Id. at 1320. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 1320-21 (stating that defendant and a friend were handcuffed by the police “un-
der protest”). 
202 Id. at 1321. 
203 Cosme, 397 N.E.2d at 1321 (explaining that the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser 
charge following the denial of his motion, then appealed to the Appellate Division, which 
affirmed the conviction). 
204 Id. at 1323. 
205 Id. (stating that since the defendant gave his fiancée “an unrestricted right to share in 
the use and control of the bedroom closet,” voluntary consent given by his fiancée renders 
any latter opposition on his part as “ineffective”). 
206 590 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886-87 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1992). 
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a shelter for men being run out of the Palace Hotel.207  The night 
clerk “buzzed” the officers in and the officers proceeded to a dormi-
tory, where they found the defendant with drugs and drug parapher-
nalia.208 
While the hearing court suppressed this evidence as being the 
product of an unreasonable and unconsented to search, the First De-
partment reversed.209  Because the night clerk controlled access to 
and from the sleeping quarters, he “was authorized by the residents    
. . . to consent to entry into the room by guests, visitors, and any oth-
ers who had legitimate business there.”210  Furthermore, the court 
noted that the defendant could not even sustain an argument under 
the Fourth Amendment, as a reasonable expectation of privacy in an 
area is requisite for such an argument.211  As the defendant shared an 
open “communal” room with other persons, anything done in the 
open is considered “forfeit [of] any reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.”212 
In People v. Fayton,213 the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, surveyed the scope of consent that can be given by a third par-
ty.214  The third party in this case was the complainant who had in-
formed the police that she had been “menaced [by the defendant] 
with a gun.”215  The complainant shared an apartment with the defen-
dant and knew where the defendant kept his weapon.216  The officers 
received express consent from the complainant to search the apart-
 
207 Id. at 886. 
208 Id.  
[The officer] noticed defendant sitting on one of the beds . . . folding a 
small piece of aluminum foil.  Between [the defendant‟s] legs was a 
plastic bag containing white powder.  The officer also noticed [on] . . . 
the bed . . . a glassine envelope which the officer believed to contain he-
roin. 
209 Id. at 887. 
210 Id. 
211 Nalbandian, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 887 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring)). 
212 Id. 
213 715 N.Y.S.2d 2 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2000). 
214 Id. at 3. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. (“The complainant . . . informed the police that there was a gun in the apartment 
[and] gave the gun‟s precise location . . . .”). 
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ment and subsequently arrested the defendant.217 
The suppression hearing resulted in a denial of defendant‟s 
motion to suppress the gun.218  On appeal, the First Department held 
that an individual with apparent authority over a shared area may 
both grant access to and determine the scope of the search conducted 
by officers subsequent to his or her consent.219  Because there was 
“no indication that the room was exclusively [the] defendant‟s,” the 
scope of roommate‟s consent to search the entire apartment included 
each and every room located within.220 
IV. THE VALUE OF UNITED STATES V. HARRIS 
The court in Harris maintained the well-established federal 
court view that the consent exception to unreasonable searches under 
the Fourth Amendment is only valid when it is voluntarily given.  
Both the state and federal judiciaries support the view maintained in 
Harris, that consent to a search must be “the product of an essentially 
free and unconstrained choice.”221  The court in Harris adhered to the 
time-honored approach to the federal interpretation of voluntariness, 
in lieu of incorporating some of the ostensibly forward-thinking ap-
proaches of the state courts, such as the four-prong analysis estab-
lished by the New York Court of Appeals in Gonzalez.222 
The court in Harris also illustrates the breadth that the federal 
courts are willing to give to the scope of searches conducted by offic-
ers who receive a general consent to search.  The court here empha-
sized that a verbal consent as simple as a “ „yes‟ or „sure‟ ” provides 
the groundwork for a search that an objectively reasonable individual 
could understand as virtually all-inclusive, barring the few occasions 
where searches may include locked areas.223  By not limiting such a 
search, the court noted that general consent allows an officer to look 
anywhere within a room that evidence of illegal activity could be 
 
217 Id. 
218 Fayton, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 2. 
219 Id. at 3. 
220 Id. 
221 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *13 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225). 
222 See Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580-81 (explaining the four factors to be considered to 
determine whether consent is truly voluntary). 
223 Harris, 2011 WL 3273241, at *14. 
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found.224 
So long as consent to a search is made voluntarily, by a per-
son with the authority to do so, and the scope of the conducted search 
falls within what an objectively reasonable individual might ascertain 
as being included in such a search, the court in Harris held that it 
would be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.225  This creates 
a very minute obstacle that prosecutors in a federal court would need 
to surmount to establish a valid search.  Harris furthers the federal 
judiciary‟s apparent position in affording officers a large berth of dis-








224 Id. (quoting Snow, 44 F.3d at 135 (“It is self-evident that a police officer seeking gen-
eral permission to search a [room] is looking for evidence of illegal activity.  It is just as ob-
vious that such evidence might be hidden in closed containers.”)). 
225 Id. at *14-15. 
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